SIMULATION
Documentation Namespace, NetworkPolicy, Pod
You must connect to the correct host . Failure to do so may result in a zero score.
[candidate@base] $ ssh cks000031
Context
You must implement NetworkPolicies controlling the traffic flow of existing Deployments across namespaces.
Task
First, create a NetworkPolicy named deny-policy in the prod namespace to block all ingress traffic.
The prod namespace is labeled env:prod
Next, create a NetworkPolicy named allow-from-prod in the data namespace to allow ingress traffic only from Pods in the prod namespace.
Use the label of the prod names & Click to copy traffic.
The data namespace is labeled env:data
Do not modify or delete any namespaces or Pods . Only create the required NetworkPolicies.

See the Explanation below for complete solution
Explanation:
1) Connect to the correct host
ssh cks000031
sudo -i
2) Use admin kubeconfig (safe default)
export KUBECONFIG=/etc/kubernetes/admin.conf
PART A - Deny ALL ingress traffic in prod namespace
Requirement:
NetworkPolicy name: deny-policy
Namespace: prod (namespace is labeled env=prod)
Effect: block all ingress
3) Create deny-policy in prod
Create the policy directly with kubectl (fastest & safest):
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-policy
namespace: prod
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
EOF
✅ What this does:
podSelector: {} → selects all Pods in prod
No ingress: rules → deny all ingress traffic
4) Verify
kubectl -n prod get networkpolicy deny-policy
PART B - Allow ingress to data ONLY from Pods in prod
Requirement:
NetworkPolicy name: allow-from-prod
Namespace: data (namespace is labeled env=data)
Allow ingress only from Pods in prod namespace
Use namespace label (env=prod)
5) Create allow-from-prod policy in data
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-from-prod
namespace: data
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
env: prod
EOF
✅ What this does:
Applies to all Pods in data
Allows ingress only from namespaces labeled env=prod
All other ingress traffic is denied by default
6) Verify
kubectl -n data get networkpolicy allow-from-prod
FINAL CHECK (What the examiner expects)
kubectl get networkpolicy -n prod
kubectl get networkpolicy -n data
You should see:
deny-policy in prod
allow-from-prod in data

SIMULATION
Create a new NetworkPolicy named deny-all in the namespace testing which denies all traffic of type ingress and egress traffic

You can create a "default" isolation policy for a namespace by creating a NetworkPolicy that selects all pods but does not allow any ingress traffic to those pods.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
You can create a "default" egress isolation policy for a namespace by creating a NetworkPolicy that selects all pods but does not allow any egress traffic from those pods.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-all-egress
spec:
podSelector: {}
egress:
- {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
Default deny all ingress and all egress traffic
You can create a "default" policy for a namespace which prevents all ingress AND egress traffic by creating the following NetworkPolicy in that namespace.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-all
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
This ensures that even pods that aren't selected by any other NetworkPolicy will not be allowed ingress or egress traffic.

SIMULATION

Context
The kubeadm-created cluster's Kubernetes API server was, for testing purposes, temporarily configured to allow unauthenticated and unauthorized access granting the anonymous user duster-admin access.
Task
Reconfigure the cluster's Kubernetes API server to ensure that only authenticated and authorized REST requests are allowed.
Use authorization mode Node,RBAC and admission controller NodeRestriction.
Cleaning up, remove the ClusterRoleBinding for user system:anonymous.

See the Explanation below
Explanation:

SIMULATION
Cluster: dev
Master node: master1
Worker node: worker1
You can switch the cluster/configuration context using the following command:
[desk@cli] $ kubectl config use-context dev
Task:
Retrieve the content of the existing secret named adam in the safe namespace.
Store the username field in a file names /home/cert-masters/username.txt, and the password field in a file named /home/cert-masters/password.txt.
1. You must create both files; they don't exist yet.
2. Do not use/modify the created files in the following steps, create new temporary files if needed.
Create a new secret names newsecret in the safe namespace, with the following content:
Username: dbadmin
Password: moresecurepas
Finally, create a new Pod that has access to the secret newsecret via a volume:
Namespace: safe
Pod name: mysecret-pod
Container name: db-container
Image: redis
Volume name: secret-vol
Mount path: /etc/mysecret

See the Explanation below
Explanation:

SIMULATION
You must complete this task on the following cluster/nodes:
Cluster: trace
Master node: master
Worker node: worker1
You can switch the cluster/configuration context using the following command:
[desk@cli] $ kubectl config use-context trace
Given: You may use Sysdig or Falco documentation.
Task:
Use detection tools to detect anomalies like processes spawning and executing something weird frequently in the single container belonging to Pod tomcat.
Two tools are available to use:
1. falco
2. sysdig
Tools are pre-installed on the worker1 node only.
Analyse the container's behaviour for at least 40 seconds, using filters that detect newly spawning and executing processes.
Store an incident file at /home/cert_masters/report, in the following format:
[timestamp],[uid],[processName]
Note: Make sure to store incident file on the cluster's worker node, don't move it to master node.

See the Explanation below
Explanation:
$vim /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml
- rule: Container Drift Detected (open+create)
desc: New executable created in a container due to open+create
condition: >
evt.type in (open,openat,creat) and
evt.is_open_exec=true and
container and
not runc_writing_exec_fifo and
not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and
not user_known_container_drift_activities and
evt.rawres>=0
output: >
%evt.time,%user.uid,%proc.name # Add this/Refer falco documentation
priority: ERROR
$kill -1 <PID of falco>
Explanation:
[desk@cli] $ ssh node01
[node01@cli] $ vim /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml
search for Container Drift Detected & paste in falco_rules.local.yaml
[node01@cli] $ vim /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml
- rule: Container Drift Detected (open+create)
desc: New executable created in a container due to open+create
condition: >
evt.type in (open,openat,creat) and
evt.is_open_exec=true and
container and
not runc_writing_exec_fifo and
not runc_writing_var_lib_docker and
not user_known_container_drift_activities and
evt.rawres>=0
output: >
%evt.time,%user.uid,%proc.name # Add this/Refer falco documentation
priority: ERROR
[node01@cli] $ vim /etc/falco/falco.yaml